MIT
Science, Technology, and
National Security Working Group

# How Strategic Anti-Missile Defense of the United States Could be Made to Work

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# Extremely Important

## US Missile Defense Policy is shaped mostly by US DOMESTIC POLITICS

# A Comment on the State of US Domestic Politics

**Paul Krugman,**
**Nobel Prize Winner in Economics and New York Times Columnist**

**Commenting on the US debate over economic priorities:**

**"what we have … is a political culture in which one side sneers at knowledge and exalts ignorance, while the other side hunkers down and pretends to halfway agree."**

**Paul Krugman, *Dumbing Deficits Down*, New York Times, March 10, 2011**

# The same observation applies to Missile Defense

# Why Should the US Consider an Alternative to Its Current Missile Defense Program?

1. **Current Missile Defenses Will Never Be Reliable.**

   The sensor trechnologies used by current missile defenses will never be able to tell the difference between warheads and decoys.

2. **Paradoxically, Foreign Military Planners Will Assume Worst-Case US Capabilities and Will React As If US Missile Defenses Might Work.**

   US missile defenses will unleash powerful bureaucratic forces that foreign political leaders cannot always contend with.

   Even when foreign leaders are well informed about its limitations, they are subject to accusations of not being willing to defend their countries from this external threat.

   Perceived threats from US missile defenses also create powerful tools for bureaucracies aiming to increase their access to resources, power, and influence.

   Witness the vast expansion in the US nuclear arsenal in-part fueled by claims that the Moscow Anti-Missile Defense posed a major threat to US nuclear deterrence.

# Why Should the US Consider an Alternative to Its Current Missile Defense Program?

3. **Foreign Reactions to US Missile Defenses Might Result In:**

   China Expanding Its Currently Modest Long-Range Missile Forces

   Russia Refusing to Engage in Further Arms Reductions.

   Iran and North Korea Rendering US Ballistic Missile Defenses Useless by Developing Simple and Robust Countermeasures.

   India Continuing to Mimick the Mistakes of the United States by Expanding Its Missile Defense Program.

   Pakistan Further Reacting (It is Already Expanding Its Nuclear Materials Stockpiles) to Threats from India's Missile Defense Program.

# Why Should the US Consider an Alternative to Its Current Missile Defense Program?

**Hence,**

**Current US Missile Defense Programs Could Lead to the Worst of Two Worlds.**

**Defenses That Don't Work and Foreign Reactions to the Missile Defenses As If They do Work.**

**The End Result Would Then Be a Reduction in US Security**

# Why Should the US Consider an Alternative to Its Current Missile Defense Program?

The alternative missile defense to be described would work, unlike the current sytems under development.

It would be highly intimidating against the adversaries it is aimed at.

It would pose no threat to the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and China.

However, it will not be built,

because the argument that long-range ballistic missiles from rogue states threaten the security of the United States is derived from domestic political infighting, not from a true belief that there is a threat.

If the threat were perceived as truly real, we would be racing to build this alternative, which would be a highly workable defense.

# How Current US Missile Defenses Are Supposed to Work

# Basic Functional Architecture of a Baseline and Expanded National Missile Defense



# Notional GMD Engagement of a Ballistic Missile Attack from North Korea



# The Rise of the "Phased Adaptive Approach" as a Replacement for the European Missile Defense System

# The Phased Adaptive Approach Simply Replaces a Small Number of Heavy Ground-Based Interceptors with Numerous Light Sea-Mobile

# Orbital Sciences Ground-Based Interceptor and Raytheon Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle

| Estimated Dimensions and Weight of the National Missile Defense Launch Vehicle | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rocket Components | Length (ft) | Diameter (ft) | Component Weight (lbs) |
| Shroud | 11.6 | 4.17 | 200 |
| Payload (Kill Vehicle) | – | – | 155 |
| Payload Adaptor | – | – | – |
| 1st Stage (Orion 50XLG) | 33.8 | 4.17 | 37,800 |
| 2nd Stage (Orion 50XL) | 11.7 | 4.17 | 9,500 |
| Total | 51.4 | – | 47,655 |

| Estimated Performance Parameters of the National Missile Defense Launch Vehicle | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rocket Components | Burn Time (sec) | Vacuum Specific Impulse (sec) | Vacuum Thrust (lbs) | Component Weight (lbs) | Propellant Weight (lbs) | Empty Weight (lbs) | Empty/Full Mass Fraction |
| Shroud | – | – | – | 200 | – | | |
| Payload (Kill Vehicle) | – | – | – | 155 | – | | |
| Payload Adaptor | – | – | – | – | – | | |
| 1st Stage (Orion 50XLG) | 70 | 295 | 149,500 | 37,800 | 35,480 | 2,320 | 0.0614 |
| 2nd Stage (Orion 50XL) | 70 | 289 | 36,000 | 9,500 | 8,680 | 820 | 0.0859 |
| Total | 140 | – | – | 47,655 | – | | |



# Navy Aegis Concept of Operation
# Ship Radar Inadequate, Land Radar Marginal, and Interceptor Acceleration and Speed Low



# The US Domestic Politics of Missile Defense

- Before Obama took office he expressed skepticism about whether existing science could produce workable missile defenses.
- Once he became President, he decided to "give his opponents what they want" by "pretending his administration had a better idea of how to build such defenses." (The Phased Adaptive Approach)
- The Obama Administration now says that the better idea is the "Phased Adaptive Approach" to missile defense.
- In reality, the "Phased Adaptive Approach" has no technical merit.

# What are the true and expected capabilities of the PAA?

The PAA uses no new technologies relative to the European Missile Defense System that was "put aside" on September 17, 2010 by the Obama Administration.

PAA interceptors home on targets using the same infrared technology that makes the unproven GMD interceptors vulnerable to simple infrared countermeasures.

The PAA radars do not have sufficient average power and aperture area to reliably acquire and track targets in combat.

The radars also provide very limited discrimination capability, as demonstrated by the catastrophic failure of the Sea-Based X-Band radar during the FTG-06 GMD test on January 31, 2010.

All the X-Band radars being used by the PAA, like the FBX, depend on the same science and technology to achieve discrimination.

# The SM-3 Block IA Has Only Been Tested on Short Range Trajectories

**Yet the Department of Defense Claims that the System is "Proven and Effective" and Can Be Modernized to Deal With Much More Challenging Targets.**
**Like the GMD, It Has Never Been Tested Against Credible Decoys or Other Simple Countermeasures**



# PAA Tests Essentially Use Modified Two-Stage Surface-to-Air Missiles, Warheads and SM-3 Interceptors









# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems



# All the Interceptors in the GMD and PAA Systems Home on Targets Using Infrared Telescopes

# All of the Missile Defense Kill Vehicles Use the Same Infrared Technology to Identify and Home on Targets

Ground-Based Kill Vehicle




Navy Large-Aperture
High Divert-Speed
SM-3 Block II Kill Vehicle








# The Same Basic Physics Governs the Homing of All the Kill Vehicles

Ground-Based Kill Vehicle




Navy SM-3 Block IA Kill Vehicle



All the Kill Vehicles Use a Telescope and Infrared Sensors for Homing on Targets



# What the US Defense Planner Expects the Kill Vehicle to See

# What the Defense Planners Expect the Infrared Sensor on the Homing Interceptor to See

# What the US Kill Vehicle Might Actually See

# What the Infrared Sensor on the Homing Interceptor Might Actually See!

# EXTREMELY IMPORTANT INFORMATION NEEDED BY THE INTERCEPTOR TO IDENTIFY WHICH OBJECT IS THE WARHEAD

- The interceptor must know how the warhead looks relative to other objects in its field of view
- This information is essential for matching what it sees to what it expects to see.
- If the warhead appears different from what is expected, the interceptor will not be able to identify it relative to other objects.
- If the other objects match, or nearly match, the expected appearance of the warhead, then the interceptor will not be able to identify the warhead relative to the other objects.
- If all the objects look different from what is expected, and all the objects look different from each other, then the interceptor will not be able to identify the warhead relative to the other objects.
- HENCE, all an adversary needs to do to defeat the interceptor is to alter the appearance of the warhead and surround it with other unidentifiable objects

# False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agency Test Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975, Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT)

**Booster Fragmentation**




Titan II outboard configuration.
6 July 1960. The Martin Co., Denver.

# False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agency Test Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975, Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT)






6 Ft Man and
Minuteman Warhead

Figure 8.4. The Signature of Fragmented Tanks experiment cut the Stage II of Titan II ICBM B-27 (62-008) into the numerous pieces shown above. The resulting debris cloud was used to test the ability of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile radar system to discriminate between debris from the upper stage and the reentry vehicle. From David K. Stumpf , "Titan II, A History of a Cold War Missile Program," The University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville, Copyright 2000, pages 200-201

# False Targets Cloud Created by a "Simple" One-Stage Ballistic Missile

**Figure 3:** The images below show how North Korea or Iran could defeat the SM-3 or GMD homing systems by simply using technology they already have demonstrated in flight tests. The technology used to separate rocket stages is exactly the same as that needed to cut a rocket or rocket stage into separate fragments. It would then not be possible for the sensor on the homing interceptor to tell which end of a fragment has the warhead, or which fragment has the warhead. The homing process could be yet further degraded by deploying balloons that would look like warheads to the distant Kill Vehicle. There is no publicly available information that indicates this last countermeasure technology has yet been demonstrated by North Korea or Iran.

# Conclusion from US Navy Videos of "Successful Intercepts

**Simple countermeasures that disguise the location of the warhead from the infrared homing sensors are very easy to implement and Will Drastically Reduce the Chances of Hitting a Target**

These Could Be Used as Decoys
or to Surround Warheads Disguising Them as Balloons

**Balloons that Have Been Flown in Space**

# The Kill Vehicle Must Determine Which of These Are Warheads and Which are Decoys from 50 (SM-3) to Several Hundred (GMD) Kilometers Range!




The IEO, an inflatable erectable decoy for Minuteman
(L'Garde, Inc. Photo)

Mk 12A Minuteman III Reentry Vehicle

# Why the SM-3 Missile Defense Could Appear to Be Threatening Even Though Its Capabilities are Obviously Limited

# Basic Functional Architecture of a Baseline and Expanded National Missile Defense



# Navy Aegis Concept of Operation
# Ship Radar Inadequate, Land Radar Marginal, and Interceptor Acceleration and Speed Low



# Locations of the Vertical Launch System Boxes on Two Different Variants of the DDG-51 Navy Destroyer



# Basic Characteristics of the Vertical Launch System Components




SM-3 Block IIA
21” Diameter
4,000 – 5000 lb
Interceptor



# Aegis Block IA Interceptor and Vertical Launch Cannister

# Basic Operational Characteristics of the Vertical Launch System Components





# Basic Operational Characteristics of the Vertical Launch System Components

SM-3 Block IA/B Weight ~ 3300 lbs;  Block IIA/B ~ 5100 lbs;
Mk 57 Max Encanistered ~ 9020 lbs

Mk 57 Max Encanistered ~ 9020 lbs

Mk 57 Max Encanistered ~ 9020 lbs





# Variants of the Aegis SM-3 Interceptor and Kill Vehicles

| | Burnout Speed ≈ 3 km/sec | | Burnout Speed ≈ 4.5 km/sec | Burnout Speed ≈ 5.5 – 6 km/sec |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ***Block IA*** | ***Block IB*** | ***Block IIA*** | ***Block IIB*** |
| | Kill Warhead (KW)<br>• 1-Color Seeker<br>• Divert & Attitude Control System (DACS) | KW<br>• 2-Color Seeker<br>• Improved Optics<br>• Advanced Signal Processor<br>• Improved DACS | 21″ Nosecone<br>Large Diameter KW<br>• Advanced Discrimination Seeker<br>• High Divert DACS | Improved KW |
| | Stage 2 & 3:<br>• 13.5″ Propulsion | Stage 2 & 3:<br>• 13.5″ Propulsion | Stage 2 & 3:<br>• 21″ Propulsion | High Performance Upper Stage<br>Stage 2:<br>• 21″ Propulsion |
| | Stage 1:<br>• MK 72 Booster<br>• MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) Compatible | Stage 1:<br>• MK 72 Booster<br>• MK 41 VLS | Stage 1:<br>• MK 72 Booster<br>• MK 41 VLS | Stage 1: Existing MK 72 Booster |



*AEGIS BMD SM-3 EVOLUTION. The SM-3 is being fielded in "blocks" as technology advances, enabling improved defense through upgrades to the interceptor.*

# Aegis BMD SM-3 Evolution Plan

| Block IA | Block IB | Block II | Block IIA |
|---|---|---|---|
|  Block 2004<br>• 1-Color Seeker<br>• Pulsed DACS | • 2- Color Seeker<br>- Increased IR Acquisition<br>- Improved Discrimination<br>• TDACS<br>- Increased Divert<br>- Lowers AUR Cost<br>• All-Reflective Optics (ARO)<br>• Advanced Signal Processor (ASP) | High Velocity Variant<br>  <br>• Block IB Seeker<br>• 21" Propulsion<br>- 2nd & 3rd Stage<br>- Increased Missile Vbo = xx<br>• 21" Nosecone<br>• MK 41 VLS Compatible | High Divert Variant<br>  <br>• Large Diameter KW<br>- Advanced Discrimination Seeker<br>- High Divert DACS<br>• 21" Propulsion<br>- 2nd & 3rd Stage<br>- Increased Missile Vbo = yy<br>• 21" Nosecone<br>• MK 41 VLS Compatible<br>  |
| Block 2004 | Block 2008 | Block 2010 / 2012 | Block 2012 / 2014 |

Funded Since PB06 | Capability Change From Previous Block

# Variants of the Aegis SM-3 Interceptor and Kill Vehicles




**Model Interceptor Parameters**

**Kill Vehicle**
Weight≈132? lbs

**Third Stage Motor**
$I_{sp}$≈289 sec
Weight≈600 lbs
Fuel Load≈0.90

**Second Stage Motor**
$I_{sp}$≈280 sec
Weight≈2000 lbs
Fuel Load≈0.85

**First Stage Motor**
$I_{sp}$≈220 sec
Weight≈1200 lbs
Fuel Load≈0.75

# Capabilities of the Future 4.5 km/sec and 5.5 km/sec Variants of the SM-3 Block IIA and Block IIB Interceptors to Engage ICBMs



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

# Kinematic Capabilities of Future 4.0 km/sec and 4.5 km/sec Variants of the SM-3 Block II Interceptors to Engage ICBMs



# Kinematic Capabilities of a 4.5 km/sec SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor

All ICBM Attack Corridors from Russia to the United States Could Be Covered by Suitably Placed SM-3 Aegis-Armed Destroyers

All ICBM and Interceptor trajectory locations marked at one minute intervals.



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

# The End Result of the Phased Adaptive Approach and the US Domestic Political Failures that Led to It

Military planners have the responsibility of looking towards future threats.
Increase in number and speed of the Interceptors
Increase in the capabilities and numbers of radars
Concerns about possible prior damage to nuclear forces from pre-emptive strikes.
Interceptors with small nuclear weapons

## Result

Military planners may recognize that the current US missile defense system has limited capabilities, but they will have to consider and plan for possible future expansions and upgrades of the system.

One way to deal with such circumstances would be for China to expand its nuclear forces and to also increase its emphasis on countermeasures.

Hence, the US preoccupation with missile defenses that have little capability coud create the worst of two worlds for both China and the US, US defenses that are not reliable, and a Chinese reaction that would be expensive and dangerous to the security of both China and the US.

## An example from history.

Vast expansion of US nuclear strike forces in response to the Russian Moscow missile defense

# A National Defense Strategy Based on Provably False Assumptions

- **Assumptions Used by the DoD for GMD Performance Cannot Possibly be Known Hence, Actual Performance of the GMD is Unknowable**
- **The Record of "Proven Reliability" of the Navy's SM-3 Interceptor Actually Shows that the SM-3 Will Be Highly Unreliable in Actual Combat Conditions**




MISSILE DEFENSE THEORISTS

- NO SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS
- TECHNOLOGY IS ALREADY IN-HAND
- CURRENT MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS WORK
- US SELF DECEPTION ABOUT ROBUST MISSILE DEFENSES WILL CAUSE PROLIFERATORS TO GIVE UP

**Tony Auth** Philadelphia Inquirer, Universal Uclick

# If People Were Serious About the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States – What Could Be Done Instead?

# If There Is a Real Threat – What Is It?

- The Only Long-Range Ballistic Missiles that Can Be Built by Iran and North Korea Would Use Liquid Propellant Rocket Technologies from the 1950s and 1960s.
- These Technologies Use Heavy Airframes, Low Energy Rocket Propellants, and Rocket Motors of that Have Relatively Low Exhaust Velocities (Specific Impulses)
- The Rockets Would Be Very Big – Weighing Between 90 to 120 Tons – and Would Have to be Assembled at Known Launch Sites.
- Hence, They Could Easily Be Targeted and Shot Down Shortly After They Are Launched.

**What Are the Prospects for Building a Reliable, Robust, and Intimidating Boost-Phase Ballistic Missile Defense that Could Defend the Continental United States from Strategic Nuclear-Armed ICBM Attack?**

# Powered Flight Locations of a Titan II / SS-18 Class Liquid Propellant ICBM



# ICBM Attack Corridors from Iran to the United States



# Coverage Against Unha-2 – Like Large Liquid Propellant with 240 Second + Burn is Possible

**5 km/sec Interceptor, ~500 km range in about 100 seconds, Unha-2 Ballistic Missile gets to about 400 km in about 240 seconds**

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

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

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

# Stealthy Drone That Carries a Payload of 4500 pounds, Which Is More Than Enough to Accommodate Two 2000 pound Interceptors, or a Single Heavier Interceptor

Two Views Showing the Shape of the Northrop X-47B Stealthy Pilotless Drone




This particular drone can carry a payload of 4500 pounds, which is more than enough to accommodate two 2000 pound interceptors, or a single heavier interceptor. The heavier interceptor might be more desirable for situations where an interceptor burnout speed in excess of 5 km/s is desired. Smaller interceptors would probably have burnout speeds of perhaps 4 to 4 1/2 km/s. These lower burnout speeds may well be adequate.

# Estimate of the Radar Cross Section of a 50 Meter Wing Span B-2 Like Aircraft

**Target with 50m Wingspan and Covered with Radar Absorbing Material**






Radar cross section estimates from:
Computer Simulation of Aerial Target Radar Scattering, Recognition, Detection and Tracking, Yakov D. Sherman, Editor, Artech House, 2002

Radar cross-sections that are less than 0.01 m² are certainly achievable. Such small radar cross-sections require not only that the aircraft have a shape that does not strongly reflect radar signals, but it also requires that the aircraft be covered with radar absorbing material. A bare skinned version of this aircraft would have a small radar cross-section, but it would still be roughly 10 times larger relative to a similarly shaped aircraft constructed with radar absorbing materials.

# Summary

- The system requires only a small number of drones, each carrying one, or perhaps two interceptors
- A fleet of less than ten drones would be more than sufficient to keep four to five drones constantly on station.
- These drones could routinely operate outside of the national boundaries of the target state, and could not be regularly observed or tracked by air-defense radars.
- The system would have a very high intercept probability against long-range ballistic missile launches.
- It would only have to operate when a long-range ballistic missile has been set up for launch.
- The system could be diverted towards Russian or Chinese strategic missile forces, but it would have to operate within Russian and Chines airspace and only a very small number of the total number of drones could be kept on-station.
- Because the number of drones that could be kept on station would be very small, and each drone carries only one or two interceptors, the system could never have more than a negligible shoot-down capability against Russian or Chinese long-range ballistic missile forces.
- The system does not address the threats from shorter range ballistic missiles; those must be addressed by other means.

# Radar Search, Acquisition and Tracking Capabilities in the Phased Adaptive Approach is Very Weak

# Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Radar System

## Radar Characteristics

Average Power per Radar Face = 58 KW
Face Area = 12 $M^2$
3.3 GHz Frequency (S-Band)
Assumed System Losses = 10
Known System Temperature = 500°K

## Estimated Performance per Dwell

Range Against 1$M^2$ Target ≈ 900 – 1000 km
(Single 0.1 Second Dwell)
Coherent S/N = 56, Incoherent S/N ≈ 20 -25
Range Against 0.01$M^2$ Target ≈ 250 – 300 km
(Single 0.1 Second Dwell)
Coherent S/N = 56, Incoherent S/N ≈ 15 -20
Beam Width:
1.5° × 1.5° ≈ 2 Square Degrees per Dwell



# Comparison of the Relative Sizes and Average Power of the Fylingsdale UEWR, the GLOBUS II Radar at Vardo, Norway, and the Forward-Based X-Band (FBX) Radar





**Aegis Radar**
Average Power per Radar Face = 58 KW
Face Area = 12 $M^2$
3.3 GHz Frequency (S-Band)

# Radar Cross Section of Large Round-Nose Warhead




UHF Radar Cross versus Look Angle
400 to 500 MHz (UEWR)




X-Band Radar Cross versus Look Angle
10,000 MHz (10 GHz)



# Operating Frequencies of Early Warning and Missile Defense Radars

## Radar Cross Section of Rounded-Back Cones

**The operating frequency of Russia's Early Warning Radars was chosen so that the radar reflectivity of warheads approaching Russia would be as large as possible, thereby making it easier for the radars to detect the approaching warheads at very long range. However, a serious drawback associated with radars operating at these frequencies is that they highly vulnerable to blackout effects from high-altitude nuclear explosions.**







**Russian Hen House and Large Phased Arrays**

**US PAVE-PAWS and BMEWS Early Warning / Missile Defense Radars**

**US Upgraded Early Warning / Missile Defense Radars**

**US Ground-Based X-Band Radar**

# The Forward-Based X-Band Radar (FMX) Has Limited Acquisition Abilities Against 0.01 $m^2$ Cone-Shaped Warheads at Ranges Greater Than 600 to 700 km and Against 0.001 $m^2$ Targets at Ranges Greater Than 300 to 400 km

# FBX Range ≈1300 km Against Targets with RCS 0.1 m² to 0.2 m² Targets


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


FBX Range ≈1300 km against Targets with RCS 0.1 m² to 0.2 m² Targets

# PAA Missile Defense Targets and Interceptors



# Other Possible Targets for the PAA Missile Defense



# Notional Intercept Trajectory of Standard Missile 3 Block IA/B (SM-3 Block IA/B) Against 2000 km Range Iranian Ballistic Missile

## Obama Missile Defense Plan (Announced on Thursday, September 17, 2009)



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

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

# Testing Issues Directly Relevant to GMD and PAA Performance in Real Combat Conditions

# EXTREMELY IMPORTANT INFORMATION NEEDED BY THE INTERCEPTOR TO IDENTIFY WHICH OBJECT IS THE WARHEAD

- The interceptor must know how the warhead looks relative to other objects in its field of view
- This information is essential for matching what it sees to what it expects to see.
- If the warhead appears different from what is expected, the interceptor will not be able to identify it relative to other objects.
- If the other objects match, or nearly match, the expected appearance of the warhead, then the interceptor will not be able to identify the warhead relative to the other objects.
- If all the objects look different from what is expected, and all the objects look different from each other, then the interceptor will not be able to identify the warhead relative to the other objects.
- HENCE, all an adversary needs to do to defeat the interceptor is to alter the appearance of the warhead and surround it with other unidentifiable objects

# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems

## Last Five SM-3 Tests are Exact Replicas of the Same Experiment

**Even Though The Tests Were Exact Replicas of the same Simplified Experiment, the DoD Advised the President that the Tests Prove that the SM-3 Would be Effective Against Varied Missile Targets**




Last Five Experiments
Exact Replicas of the Same Experiment

### Exact Replicas of the Same Experiment

- Targets exactly the same length
- Warheads located in the same position
- Tail fins large and located in same position
- Targets always perpendicular to the line-of-sight of the closing interceptor
- Large tail fins allow identification of front from back ends
- Targets not tumbling perpendicular to interceptor line-of-sight
- Targets not tumbling in direction of interceptor line-of-sight
- Targets not broken into multiple pieces
- Warhead locations and appearances not distorted by inflated balloons
- Gulf War of 1991 – Targets Tumbled at High Altitudes, Targets Broke Into Pieces During Interceptor Homing

# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems



# False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agency Test Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975, Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT)

**Booster Fragmentation**




Titan II outboard configuration.
6 July 1960. The Martin Co., Denver.

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


Figure 8.4. The Signature of Fragmented Tanks experiment cut the Stage II of Titan II ICBM B-27 (62-008) into the numerous pieces shown above. The resulting debris cloud was used to test the ability of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile radar system to discriminate between debris from the upper stage and the reentry vehicle. From David K. Stumpf , "Titan II, A History of a Cold War Missile Program," The University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville, Copyright 2000, pages 200-201

# False Targets Cloud Created by a "Simple" One-Stage Ballistic Missile

**Figure 3:** The images below show how North Korea or Iran could defeat the SM-3 or GMD homing systems by simply using technology they already have demonstrated in flight tests. The technology used to separate rocket stages is exactly the same as that needed to cut a rocket or rocket stage into separate fragments. It would then not be possible for the sensor on the homing interceptor to tell which end of a fragment has the warhead, or which fragment has the warhead. The homing process could be yet further degraded by deploying balloons that would look like warheads to the distant Kill Vehicle. There is no publicly available information that indicates this last countermeasure technology has yet been demonstrated by North Korea or Iran.

# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems



# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems





Rotation Rate
2.5 Revolutions per Minute



Rotation Rate
5 Revolutions per Minute



Rotation Rate
7.5 Revolutions per Minute

Warhead Locations After One Second

# Conclusion from US Navy Videos of "Successful Intercepts

**Simple countermeasures that disguise the location of the warhead from the infrared homing sensors are very easy to implement and Will Drastically Reduce the Chances of Hitting a Target**

These Could Be Used as Decoys
or to Surround Warheads Disguising Them as Balloons

**Balloons that Have Been Flown in Space**

# The Kill Vehicle Must Determine Which of These Are Warheads and Which are Decoys from 50 (SM-3) to Several Hundred (GMD) Kilometers Range!




The IEO, an inflatable erectable decoy for Minuteman
(L'Garde, Inc. Photo)

Mk 12A Minuteman III Reentry Vehicle

# What the Failure of the January 31, 2010 FTG-06 Missile Defense Test Shows About the Vulnerability of the X-Band Radars Abilities to Identify Warheads Relative to Decoys

**NOTE:**
**All of the US Missile Defense Systems (GMD and SM-3) Depend on X-Band Radars to Identify Warheads Relative to Decoys**

# Why Did the FTG-06 Missile Defense Test Fail?

- The solid propellant upper rocket stage, which deployed the warhead, and possibly other objects, exhibited an unexpected phenomenon known as "chuffing."
- When a solid rocket motor burns out, sections of the remaining fuel in the spent rocket stage can spontaneously combust, causing tens or hundreds of mini-explosions per second in the shut down motor.
- This phenomenon can cause chunks of unburned fuel, insulator material, and the like to be expelled from the shut down rocket.
- The chunks of expelled rocket motor pieces have dimensions of less than one inch to 6 to 8 inches or more.
- From the point of view of the motor's mission, to accelerate a payload to a given velocity and altitude, this is an inconsequential phenomenon.

# Potential Sources of TBM Natural/Countermeasure Debris

UNCLASSIFIED

## I. Non-Separated Payloads




## II. Separated Payloads




## III. Intentional Exo Tank Breakup




## IV. Intercept




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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

EDE-GR32-117
12/9/99

# Why Did the FTG-06 Missile Defense Test Fail?

- In the FTG-06, the chuffing rocket motor expelled chunks of material that created numerous radar signals comparable in magnitude to the radar signal from a warhead.
- The radar signal therefore contained numerous unexpected targets.
- This “scene data” was passed to computers that were programmed to look for a scene that was expected.
- Since the scene was totally unexpected, the computer analysis failed catastrophically, resulting in a failure to identify the warhead, and possibly even a failure to properly track the entire complex of targets.

# Why Did the FTG-06 Missile Defense Test Fail?

## Conclusion that follows from the FTG-06 Failure

- This failure reveals the fundamental vulnerability to catastrophic failure of the GMD, SM-3 and all similar such systems.
- An adversary can inadvertently, or by design, change the scene and target appearance using simple measures, like cutting the upper stage into pieces.
- The adversary can also change the appearance of the warhead by covering it with radar absorbing materials, or surrounding it with a balloon, or by yet other methods, with totally devastating consequences for the defense.

# Radar Discrimination Capabilities

UNCLASSIFIED

## *Narrowband*




## *Non-Separated Payloads*


Solid Fuel

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# Missile Defense Agency's Claimed Solution to the Problem

- Measure the "length" of the different targets observed by the X-Band radar.
- Pieces of rocket fuel will have lengths of centimeters and warheads will have lengths of meters.
- All of the short objects can be immediately rejected as not being a warhead
- In radar terminology, this process is called "Bulk Filtering"

# Radar Discrimination Capabilities

UNCLASSIFIED

## *Narrowband*

Mean Unresolved RCS vs Scintillation Frequency




## *Wideband*

Mean Unresolved RCS vs Length




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**Make it *impossible* to measure the "length" of the warhead!**

# Examples of Radar Signals from Warheads

**C-Band (5Ghz) Radar Signal Against 1.5 Meter Long Warhead**




**X-Band (10GHz) Radar Signal Against 1.5 Meter Long Warhead**



# Some Aspects of Radar Measurement Capabilities



**X-Band (10GHz) Radar**
**Can Measure the Length**
**of the Warhead**



# Some Aspects of Radar Measurement Capabilities



**X-Band (10GHz) Radar**
**<u>Cannot</u> Measure the Length**
**of the Warhead**



# Briefing on Theater Missile Defense Technology Provided to Military Officers Visiting the MIT Security Studies Program in 1999 for Command School Training

MIT Lincoln Laboratory
244 Wood Street
Lexington, MA 02420-9108

## Missile Defense Technology

### (Can BMD Systems Work?)

Eric D. Evans
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Mini DTS Course

10 December 1999

# What the Failure of the July 8, 2000 IFT-05 Missile Defense Test Shows About the Vulnerability of the GMD and SM-3 Systems to Infrared Countermeasures

# IFT-6 Target Complex as Seen By Distant Approaching EKV

Range of Observed Target Complex ~ 230 – 250 km for FOV 1 – 1.5º




The Inflated Balloon is Heated by the Sun and is 7 to 10 Times Brighter Than the Warhead at Infrared Wavelenghts

The Kill Vehicle Has Been Programmed In Advance to Select the Least Bright Object It Is Supposed to See.

As Long As Nothing Is Done to Cause Another Object to Be the Least Bright Object, the Kill Vehicle Will Correctly Select the Warhead

# Statement Indicating that Top Management of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Knew About the Discrimination Problems Identified in the IFT-1A Experiment

"So the decoy is not going to look exactly like what we expected. It presents a problem for the system that we didn't expect,"

Statement of
Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish,
Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization,
while being filmed by 60 Minutes II after learning that
the 2.2 meter balloon misdeployed (did not inflate properly)
during the IFT-5 experiment

# IFT-6 Target Complex as Seen By Distant Approaching EKV

Range of Observed Target Complex ~ 230 – 250 km for FOV 1 – 1.5º




In The IFT-5, The Balloon Failed to Inflate, So Only the Canister, Instead of the Hot Inflated Balloon, Would Have Been Observed By the Kill Vehicle.

Since the Cannister Has a very Small Signal in the Infrared, It Is Now the Least Bright Object Observed by the Kill Vehicle

Hence, The Kill Vehicle Would Now Select the Cannister as the Warhead

# Sequence of Events During Deployment of a Space-Balloon Decoy (1 of 3)



# Sequence of Events During Deployment of a Space-Balloon Decoy (2 of 3)

















# Sequence of Events During Deployment of a Space-Balloon Decoy (3 of 3)



# Sequence of Events During Deployment of a Space-Balloon Decoy (2A of 3)











# Briefing on Theater Missile Defense Technology Provided to Military Officers Visiting the MIT Security Studies Program in 1999 for Command School Training

## TMD Countermeasure Concepts

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

Tumbling target
Missile or RV



Multiple objects
Frag/Segmentation, CSOs

Orientation control
RV pointing or spin-up

Anti-cueing tactics
Depl. stage disposal

Maneuvers
Evasive corkscrew, etc.

Submunitions
Early Release, CW, BW

Signature control
Low RCS, IR coatings

Enveloping structure(s)
Extended targets...



Masking
Chaff, Flares, Corner Cubes

Decoys
Radar, IR



Jammers
Escort, barrage, repeaters

Other
Suites, ARMs, EMP...

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## IR Seeker Discrimination Capabilities

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*One - Color IR Seeker*

**Metrics: Mean IR Signature Scintillation Rate**




*Two - Color IR Seeker*

**Metrics: Emissivity - Area Temperature**




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# What the Failure of the June 1997 and January 1998 IFT-1A and IFT-2 Missile Defense Tests Show About the Vulnerability of the GMD and SM-3 Systems to Infrared Countermeasures

# Fraudulent Testing of Missile Defense Systems

The Only Two Fundamental Proof-of-Concept Missile Defense Tests Experiments Yet Performed:
The IFT-1A in June 1997 and January 1998




*Source: Theodore A. Postol, M.I.T.*

# New York Times Reports Major Fraud in Missile Testing in Front Page Story

The New York Times

NEW YORK, FRIDAY, JUNE 9, 2000



$1 beyond the greater New York metropolitan

## Antimissile Testing Is Rigged To Hide a Flaw, Critics Say

By WILLIAM J. BROAD

Citing the Pentagon's own plan, critics of the proposed antimissile defense and even some military experts say all flight tests of the $60 billion weapon have been rigged to hide a fundamental flaw: The system cannot distinguish between enemy warheads and decoys.

In interviews, they said that after the system failed to achieve this crucial discrimination goal against mock targets in its first two flight tests, the Pentagon substituted simpler and fewer decoys that would be easier for the antimissile weapon to recognize.

The Pentagon's plan was obtained by Theodore A. Postol, an arms expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who opposes the weapon. It covers the four tests that have taken place as well as future tests up to the system's projected deployment in 2005.

Other technical experts who have seen it, including both antimissile and decoy designers, concurred with his criticism, as did a senior government official who has examined the Pentagon's testing plan.

"It is clear to me," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, "that none of the tests address the reasonable range of countermeasures," or decoys that an enemy would use to try to outwit an antimissile weapon.

While acknowledging the plan Dr. Postal obtained as authentic, Pentagon officials strongly defended the testing program. Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish of the Air Force, director of the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, denied that his program had engaged in any deception or dumbing down. General Kadish said that the testing program would be extremely useful and that the resulting weapon would defeat crude warheads launched by inexperienced nuclear powers that might emerge in the future, like Iran, Iraq or North Korea.

Though unclassified, the plan is considered sensitive. Dr. Postol said he obtained it from a Pentagon source he would not identify.

Dr. Postol, who is preparing a report for the White House on what he sees as the plan's flaws, made his argument on Monday at a meeting of the State Department's advisory board on arms control, along with another antimissile critic, Nira Schwartz. Dr. Schwartz, a former senior engineer at the military contractor TRW, lost her job after challenging the claims the company made about the weapon's ability to distinguish warheads from decoys.

Dr. Postol, who worked in the Reagan administration on such issues as antimissile defense, says that the Pentagon has ignored earlier criticism like Dr. Schwartz's and instead put flawed testing methods at the heart of all its plans to develop and build a weapon. The upshot, he says,

Continued on Page A22



## *Critics Maintain Pentagon Has Been Rigging Antimissile Tests to Hide a Crucial Flaw*

*Continued From Page A1*

is that any real attacker — no matter how inexperienced — would be able to easily outwit the weapon.

Pentagon officials "are systematically lying about the performance of a weapon system that is supposed to defend the people of the United States from nuclear attack," Dr. Postol said in an interview.

General Kadish conceded that "this technology is difficult." As a result, he said, his organization's approach "is to walk before we run, with increasingly stressful decoys to match what we expect" by way of enemy threats. "When we get to that end point," he said, "we'll have the confidence to put this on alert."

But far from increasing the complexity of future tests, the Pentagon has made them easier, military experts who examined the testing plan agreed. Two rigorous experiments, in 1997 and 1998, to have the weapon simply observe the targets, they said, have been followed by interception tests designed to make discriminating between decoys and mock warheads as easy as possible.

"They did a good fox trot for the first couple of tests and then slowed down to a crawl," said Bob Dietz, a retired former designer of warhead decoys for American missiles. "You have to ask why they don't build better decoys. They've always said they'd get better with time."

Michael W. Munn, a retired scientist for the military contractor Lockheed and a pioneer in designing and testing antimissile weapons, said: "The only way to make it work is to dumb it down. There's no other way to do it. Discrimination has always been the No. 1 problem, and it will always remain that way."

He said manipulation of antimissile flight tests was nothing new. "It's always been a wicked game," Mr. Munn said.

The Pentagon itself is sharply divided on the testing issue. In February, Philip E. Coyle III, the Defense Department's director of testing and evaluation, faulted the antimissile tests as insufficiently realistic to make decisions about moving from research to building the weapon.

The 16 interception test flights called for in the development program would cost at least $1.6 billion, Pentagon experts say. So far, the two observation tests have been followed by two interception attempts, the first successful, the second a failure. Another test is scheduled in July.

The Clinton administration plans to make a decision later this year on whether to start building the antimissile system, which is to shield the United States from limited missile attacks by so-called rogue states.

Dr. Postol, a professor of science and national security studies at M.I.T. and the author of many private and federal weapon reports, was a top Navy science adviser in the Reagan administration and for decades has studied enemy countermeasures to antimissile weapons.

After the 1991 Persian Gulf war, he challenged the Army's claims of success for its Patriot antimissile system, saying it had, in fact, destroyed no Iraqi missiles at all. Though the Pentagon at first denied his assertion, it later conceded that initial reports of the Patriot success had been exaggerated.

The current scientific fray centers on the interceptor's 120-pound homing device, known as a kill vehicle. Fired on a rocket, it is designed to use a telescopic sensor, a computer and jet thrusters to steer itself through space toward a warhead, destroying it by force of impact.

Dr. Postol's critique involves its hardest job, distinguishing between actual enemy warheads and the cloud of decoys considered sure to be launched to disguise them. If unable to tell decoys from warheads, a defender would be forced to fire interceptors at every threatening object, quickly exhausting a defensive force.

Dr. Postol began digging into the first antimissile flight test, in June 1997, after reviewing Pentagon data gathered by Dr. Schwartz.

The sensors at issue are cooled to more than 400 degrees below zero and work in the icy void of space to track faint heat emissions from warm targets, just as ordinary telescopes track light. They see warheads and decoys as twinkling points of light, like stars.

The June 1997 flight test, Dr. Postol asserted, showed that the infrared twinkles were random and insufficiently different from one another to let the interceptor distinguish among them, and that the Pentagon had conspired to hide this surprising discovery. The Pentagon, he said, has altered future tests to artificially heighten any differences that could be detected between warheads and decoys.

His accusation is based mainly on a detailed chart from the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization that gives an overview of its program for Integrated Flight Tests of the kill vehicle. Entitled "I.F.T. Targets Selections," the chart is dated May 5, 2000, and at the top is labeled "For Planning Purposes." The chart's bottom warns, "Configuration controlled by N.M.D. J.P.O.," or the National Missile Defense Joint Program Office. "Do not alter this document."

The chart starts with the June 1997 test, lists another sensor flight and then goes through the 16 intercept tests scheduled for the kill vehicle's entire development. The last flight is listed as June 2064, right before the antimissile weapon is to begin operating in 2005. In each case, the chart spells out the exact type and number of test decoys and warheads and depicts them in small pictures.

Dr. Postol said the chart shows how the initial suite of challenging decoys, the ones that twinkled a lot, making them hard to distinguish from a warhead, had been replaced by fewer and simpler decoys that twinkled as little as possible, accentuating their differences from warheads that fluctuate a lot in infrared intensity.

Long and conelike, pointy at one end, flat at the other, the warheads can wobble and shift in complex ways while moving through space, presenting differing heat emissions to a distant sensor. By contrast, the spherical decoy balloons have more uniform signatures.

The removed decoys, Dr. Postol said in his report, all had infrared signatures similar to the warheads. Abandoned were spherical balloons whose stripes made their infrared emissions fluctuate, rigid decoys that looked like warheads and balloons that inflated to conelike shapes.

"These decoys," he wrote, "have brightness and time-dependent oscillating signals that can be quite similar to the signals from either warheads that are spinning around their axis of symmetry, or tumbling end over end."

The only retained decoys, he said, were spherical, uniform in materials and substantially brighter or dimmer than warheads. Their signatures, he said, "will have very uniform and controlled intensities."

All the program's interception tests, Dr. Postol said in the draft report to the White House, "have been carefully orchestrated to avoid encountering the discrimination problems." In an interview, he said he hoped to get the report, a draft of which runs to 20 pages, to the White House next week.

General Kadish, while saying the planning chart was authentic, if tentative, strongly denied that the testing program had been structured to become increasingly easy. To the contrary, he said, the decoys were selected to make the evolving tests increasingly hard.

"Complexity is increasing," he said.

Asked how a smooth balloon could be more difficult to track than a rigid decoy shaped to look like a warhead, he replied, "That's a valid technical argument," but he added that just because a decoy seemed effective "doesn't mean its credible."

The test program, he said, was structured to make the weapon flexible and robust. Testing it against decoy shapes that were too specific might allow an enemy to fool the weapon by changing them "a little bit," General Kadish said. "What we're after is a basic physics approach."

Previously, Pentagon officials have said they reduced the complexity of some antimissile testing when the government cut the program's goal from trying to knock out advanced warheads from countries like Russia and China to more primitive ones from rogue states.

Lt. Col. Richard Lehner of the Air Force, an antimissile spokesman, said the current testing diagram depicts provisional goals rather than a hard and fast plan. The only decoy configuration set in concrete, he added, was the next test flight, which has been delayed repeatedly and is now scheduled for the first week of July.

Yesterday, Dr. Postol belittled the Pentagon's retorts, saying they were misrepresenting the program's logic. "They've been caught in one outright lie after another," he said.

**KEEPING TRACK**

### Bar Reported Lowered For Missile Defense Tests

Theodore A. Postol and other critics of the proposed National Missile Defense system argue that future tests of the system are being manipulated to hide the fact that it cannot differentiate between realistic decoys and the warheads it is intended to intercept. The next test is set for July.




**June 1997 and Jan. 98 Tests:**
**TWO TESTS WITH CREDIBLE DECOYS**

The Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) sees the signals from distant objects as fluctuating points of light. The light from a rotating balloon covered with stripes fluctuates like that of a warhead changing its orientation as it rotates and/or tumbles in space. If the balloon is not clearly brighter or darker it becomes undistinguishable from the target.




Source: Theodore A. Postol, M.I.T.

**July 2000 Test:**
**DECOYS REMOVED**

After the second test, the only decoys retained were those that are spherical, and substantially brighter or dimmer than target warheads, and thus easily distinguishable




**June 2003 Test:**
**DECOYS REPLACED**

All new decoys are modified to be featureless spheres so they have no time-varying signals like those of the non-spherical spinning and tumbling warheads.




The New York Times

Rick Friedman for The New York Times

Theodore A. Postol, the M.I.T. professor who obtained the Pentagon's antimissile testing plan.

# Purpose of the Baseline Algorithm (BLA)

- **Identify Known Objects By Matching *Expected* Appearance to *Observed* Appearance.**
- **Similar to Visually Identifying Suitcases at an Airport**

# Objects Flown in the IFT-1A and IFT-2 NMD Tests

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| LARGEBAL |  | Large Balloon<br>(2.2 Meter Diameter Balloon) |
| SCLR |  | Small Canisterized<br>Light Replica (Balloon) |
| MEDBALA |  | Medium Balloon A<br>(0.6 Meter Diameter Balloon) |
| MEDBALB |  | Medium Balloon B<br>(0.6 Meter Diameter Balloon) |
| MEDRLR1 |  | Medium Rigid Light Replica 1<br>(2 Meters Long & 0.6 Meter Base) |
| MEDRLR2 |  | Medium Rigid Light Replica 2<br>(2 Meters Long & 0.6 Meter Base) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| MSLS |  | Mission Service Launch System<br>(Rocket Upper Stage) |
| SCTBA |  | Small Cannisterized Traffic Balloon A<br>(Small Balloon) |
| SCTBB |  | Small Cannisterized Traffic Balloon B<br>(Small Balloon) |
| MRV |  | Medium Reentry Vehicle<br>(2 Meters Long & 0.6 Meter Base) |

# Non-Gaussian Behavior of the Data from the IFT-1A Experiment

## Expected Values (One-σ Ellipse) for the Composite Intensity and Fluctuation in Composite Intensity for IFT-1A Target Set




Example of Warhead

Example of Possible "Replica" Decoy





Example of Striped Balloon Decoy

Reference:

Transparent Overlay of Figures 4 and 5 from the POET Report 1998-5

# Original Plans to Fly Ten or More Objects in IFT-3 and IFT-4 Experiments

UNCLASSIFIED

Nichols Research

## TSRD TARGET REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY (IFT-1 – 1FT-4) (U)

NRC

### IFT 1&2
### SENSOR FLIGHT TESTS
### AUG 96 / NOV 96

1 MED RV (I)
2 MED RIGID LIGHT REPLICAS (MRLR) (I)
2 MED BALLOONS (MB) (U)
1 CANISTERIZED LIGHT REPLICA (CLR) (I)
2 CANISTERIZED TRAFFIC BALLOONS (CTB) (I)
1 LG BALLOON (LB) (U)




### IFT 3&4
### EKV FLIGHT TESTS
### OCT 97 / JAN 98

1 MED RV (I)
2 MED RIGID LIGHT REPLICAS (MRLR) (I)
3 MED BALLOONS (MB) (U)
1 CANISTERIZED LIGHT REPLICA (CLR) (I)
2 CANISTERIZED TRAFFIC BALLOONS (CTB) (I)
1 LG BALLOON (LB) (U)




I - INSTRUMENTED
U - UNINSTRUMENTED

LARGE CL
MED. CLA
SMALL CL

, Slide 40
MIT Briefing
April 13, 2006

# After First Test Failed, All Subsequent Tests Rigged to Avoid the Further Failures



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

# Claims of Success in the IFT-1A and IFT 2 Experiments Made to Congress

**Opening Statement By *Lieutenant General Lester L. Lyles*, USAF**
**Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization**
**before the Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations *(April 22, 1998)***
"During the past year, Mr. Chairman, ***we conducted two very successful*** NMD exoatmospheric kill vehicle - or EKV - ***flight tests***. Two different industry teams supported those efforts and are competing against each other. ***We demonstrated*** in those initial tests ***that we can*** use an EKV sensor to ***identify and track*** objects in space - including ***threat representative targets and decoys*** - and allow us to discriminate and determine what is an actual target and what is not."

**Statement of**
***Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish*, USAF**
**Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization**
**Before the**
**House Armed Services Committee**
**Subcommittee on Military Research & Development**
**Thursday, *June 22, 2000***

This significant countermeasures package [in the IFT-1A and IFT-2 experiments] contained more objects than the countermeasures packages we employed during IFT-3 and IFT-4 because ***we wanted to see how well the EKVs could discriminate within the target complex and identify the warhead. We gathered an immense amount of data that increased our confidence in our ability to meet the discrimination challenge***. ***IFT-1A and 2 demonstrated a robustness in discrimination capability that went beyond the baseline threat*** for purposes of designing the Expanded C-1 system.

***This phase began with IFT-3, a partially integrated intercept test, when we successfully demonstrated our ability to do on-board discrimination and target selection as well as hit-to-kill.***

# Claims of Success in the IFT-1A and IFT 2 Experiments Made to the Press

EKV prototypes discriminate 'spectacularly well,' boeing nmd chief says
Inside Missile Defense, September 30, 1998 -

"[The] particular target complex that these seekers were launched against was a quite sophisticated target complex, far more than we have to handle for an initial deployment," Peller noted. "Without going into details let me say that each seeker, using its own discrimination algorithms, positively nailed the reentry vehicle identified in the set of all those objects. . . . It picked it all up -- objects of all types," he said.

"We went from the case of not having any demonstrated optical discrimination to all of a sudden having an abundance of it."

BMDO BEGINS 'ORDERLY PHASEOUT' OF BOEING BACKUP NMD KILL VEHICLE
Inside Missile Defense, May 19, 2000 -

"We found that in both cases we were able to pick the reentry vehicle out of the target complex. There was just some minor adjustments done after that based on what they learned, but with the data that they had, they were able to pick it out in both cases."

Data from those tests will benefit the NMD program over the next 10 years, Englander noted.

# All the Interceptors in the GMD and PAA Systems Home on Targets Using Infrared Telescopes

# The Same Basic Physics Governs the Homing of All the Kill Vehicles

Ground-Based Kill Vehicle




Navy SM-3 Block IA Kill Vehicle



All the Kill Vehicles Use a Telescope and Infrared Sensors for Homing on Targets



# What the US Defense Planner Expects the Kill Vehicle to See

# What the Defense Planners Expect the Infrared Sensor on the Homing Interceptor to See

# What the US Kill Vehicle Might Actually See

# What the Infrared Sensor on the Homing Interceptor Might Actually See!

# EXTREMELY IMPORTANT INFORMATION NEEDED BY THE INTERCEPTOR TO IDENTIFY WHICH OBJECT IS THE WARHEAD

- The interceptor must know how the warhead looks relative to other objects in its field of view
- This information is essential for matching what it sees to what it expects to see.
- If the warhead appears different from what is expected, the interceptor will not be able to identify it relative to other objects.
- If the other objects match, or nearly match, the expected appearance of the warhead, then the interceptor will not be able to identify the warhead relative to the other objects.
- If all the objects look different from what is expected, and all the objects look different from each other, then the interceptor will not be able to identify the warhead relative to the other objects.
- HENCE, all an adversary needs to do to defeat the interceptor is to alter the appearance of the warhead and surround it with other unidentifiable objects

# False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agency Test Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975, Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT)

**Booster Fragmentation**




Titan II outboard configuration.
6 July 1960. The Martin Co., Denver.

# False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agency Test Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975, Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT)




Figure 8.4. The Signature of Fragmented Tanks experiment cut the Stage II of Titan II ICBM B-27 (62-008) into the numerous pieces shown above. The resulting debris cloud was used to test the ability of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile radar system to discriminate between debris from the upper stage and the reentry vehicle. From David K. Stumpf , "Titan II, A History of a Cold War Missile Program," The University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville, Copyright 2000, pages 200-201

# False Targets Cloud Created by a "Simple" One-Stage Ballistic Missile

**Figure 3:** The images below show how North Korea or Iran could defeat the SM-3 or GMD homing systems by simply using technology they already have demonstrated in flight tests. The technology used to separate rocket stages is exactly the same as that needed to cut a rocket or rocket stage into separate fragments. It would then not be possible for the sensor on the homing interceptor to tell which end of a fragment has the warhead, or which fragment has the warhead. The homing process could be yet further degraded by deploying balloons that would look like warheads to the distant Kill Vehicle. There is no publicly available information that indicates this last countermeasure technology has yet been demonstrated by North Korea or Iran.

# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems


FARS NEWS AGENCY


FARS NEWS AGENCY

# Balloons that Could Be Used to Make the Warhead Look Different from What is Expected

These Could Be Used as Decoys
or to Surround Warheads Disguising Them as Balloons

## Balloons that Have Been Flown in Space

# The Kill Vehicle Must Determine Which of These Are Warheads and Which are Decoys from 50 (SM-3) to Several Hundred (GMD) Kilometers Range!




The IEO, an inflatable erectable decoy for Minuteman
(L'Garde, Inc. Photo)



Mk 12A Minuteman III Reentry Vehicle

# Most Recent MDA Misrepresentation

## The SM-3 is a "Ballistic Missile Defense System [that] *has demonstrated 20 hit-to-kill intercepts* [italics added] out of 24 at sea firing attempts." **

** MDA Fact Sheet, November 24, 2009 09-MDA-5060

# Other Problems with the Homing Process
# The Kill Vehicle Must Hit the Warhead to Destroy It

Bullet Passes Through an Empty Container



Bullet Creates A Shock as It Passes Through the Material in a Filled Container

# Predictions Made by the Missile Defense Agency for a Hit on US Satellite 193 that Misses and Hits a Full Hydrazine Tank in the Satellite

Predicted Infrared Image for a Kill Vehicle Hit that ***Misses*** the Satellite's Hydrazine Tank




Predicted Infrared Image for a Kill Vehicle Hit that ***Strikes*** the Satellite's Hydrazine Tank



# Actual Infrared Image of the Kill Vehicle Hit on US Satellite 193

**Actual Infrared Image for the Kill Vehicle Hit that *Struck* the Satellite's Hydrazine Tank**



# Real World Event
# Satellite Intercept – 20 FEB 08

- **Objective**
  - Protect against potential loss of life due to uncontrolled reentry of ~ 5,400 lb (2,450 kg) satellite
  - Destroy ~ 1,000 lbs (450 kg) hydrazine fuel tank
- **Preparation**
  - 3 Standard Missiles-3 (SM-3), radars and system software extensively modified to enable intercept
- **Engagement**
  - 1 SM-3 launched by USS Lake Erie northwest of Hawaii
  - Successful intercept occurred ~153 miles (250 km) above the earth verified by 3 different phenomenlogies




Predicted Radar Image Non-Lethal Intercept




Predicted Radar Image Of Lethal Intercept




Screen Capture Of Actual Intercept


- **Post Intercept**
  - Analysis (as of 25 FEB 08) shows vast majority of intercept debris has already burned up upon reentering the Earth's atmosphere, or will do so shortly – there have been no reports of debris landing on earth
  - The 3 Aegis ships have already been reconfigured to support BMD mission

# Results of SM-3 Flight Tests Derived from MDA's Published Video Data



# The Missile Defense Agency:
# A Culture of Misrepresentation and a Repeated History of Being Caught

**Most Recent Concrete Example**

## Misrepresenting the SM-3 system test results to the press, and almost certainly to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

**"There were subsequent views not publicly released to preclude potential adversaries from seeing exactly where the target was struck, so the authors were basing their assessment on incomplete information," Rick Lehner, a spokesman for the agency, told AOL News.**

**May 15, 2010,** *MIT Gadflies Take Aim at Obama Missile Defense Plan*, **Sharon Weinberger,**

http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/mit-gadflies-take-aim-at-obama-missile-defenseplan/19477831

# Incidents of Repetitive Misrepresentations by the Missile Defense Agency – (FM-6)

"There were subsequent views not publicly released to preclude potential adversaries from seeing exactly where the target was struck, so the authors were basing their assessment on incomplete information," Rick Lehner, a spokesman for the agency, told AOL News.

HIT ON WARHEAD IN THE FM-6 TEST ON DECEMBER 11, 2003 – ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE OF SIGNIFICANT LATERAL ACCELERATION DURING HOMING



# Credible Evidence of Repetitive Lying by the Missile Defense Agency – (FM-6)

"There were subsequent views not publicly released to preclude potential adversaries from seeing exactly where the target was struck, so the authors were basing their assessment on incomplete information," Rick Lehner, a spokesman for the agency, told AOL News.

HIT ON WARHEAD IN THE FM-6 TEST ON DECEMBER 11, 2003 – ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE OF SIGNIFICANT LATERAL ACCELERATION DURING HOMING



# Credible Evidence of Repetitive Lying by the Missile Defense Agency – (FTM-11)

"There were subsequent views not publicly released to preclude potential adversaries from seeing exactly where the target was struck, so the authors were basing their assessment on incomplete information," Rick Lehner, a spokesman for the agency, told AOL News.

WARHEAD MISS IN THE FTM-11 TEST ON DECEMBER 7, 2006 – ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE OF SIGNIFICANT LATERAL ACCELERATION DURING HOMING

# Credible Evidence of Repetitive Lying by the Missile Defense Agency – (FTM-11)

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WARHEAD MISS IN THE FTM-11 TEST ON DECEMBER 7, 2006 – ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE OF SIGNIFICANT LATERAL ACCELERATION DURING HOMING



# Incidents of Repetitive Misrepresentations by the Missile Defense Agency – (FM-6)

**"There were subsequent views not publicly released to preclude potential adversaries from seeing exactly where the target was struck, so the authors were basing their assessment on incomplete information," Rick Lehner, a spokesman for the agency."**

**Lateral Accelerations Required to Shift the Impact Point 1 Meter Within 1/30th of a Second**

$$\text{Distance} = \frac{\text{acceleration} \times \text{time}^2}{2} = \frac{a\,t^2}{2}$$

$$\text{acceleration} = \frac{2D}{t^2} = \frac{2 \times 1}{0.033^2} = 1800 \text{ m/sec}^2$$

$$\text{Acceleration in Gs} = \frac{a}{g} = \frac{1800 \text{ m/sec}^2}{9.8 \text{ m/sec}^2} = 184G$$

$$\text{Required Rocket Thrust (Tonnes)} = \frac{1800\,\text{m/sec}^2 \times 25\,\text{kg}}{1000\,\text{kg/Tonne}} = 45\,\text{Tonnes} \approx$$

3 Times the Thrust of a SCUD-B Rocket Motor

# Video Animation Images Used by Missile Defense Agency to Describe the Instrumentation Used in the FM-6 Flight Test to Determine If Warhead Was Hit











FM-6 – Only Direct Hit on Warhead

# How the Pentagon Has Been Rigging the Testing of the the SM-3 Missile Defense

# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems



# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems

Terrier orion

# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems

## Has the Department of Defense Tested the SM-3 Defense System Adequately to Determine that It Will Be Robust and Reliable in Combat Conditions?

### SM-3 Intercept Test Trajectory Used by Department of Defense to Determine that the System is "Proven and Effective"



# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems

**Location Off Kauai Island Where SM-3 Tests Have Been Conducted**

# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems



# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems

## Estimated Distances and Geometry of SM-3 Flight Tests



# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems

## Estimated Distances and Geometry of SM-3 Flight Tests Projected Over Northeast of the United States for Perspective




## Estimated Test Target Altitudes and Ranges Based on Statements Made in MDA Videos and Rocket Target Calculations

# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems



# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems

## Last Five SM-3 Tests are Exact Replicas of the Same Experiment

**Even Though The Tests Were Exact Replicas of the same Simplified Experiment, the DoD Advised the President that the Tests Prove that the SM-3 Would be Effective Against Varied Missile Targets**




Last Five Experiments
Exact Replicas of the Same Experiment

### Exact Replicas of the Same Experiment

- Targets exactly the same length
- Warheads located in the same position
- Tail fins large and located in same position
- Targets always perpendicular to the line-of-sight of the closing interceptor
- Large tail fins allow identification of front from back ends
- Targets not tumbling perpendicular to interceptor line-of-sight
- Targets not tumbling in direction of interceptor line-of-sight
- Targets not broken into multiple pieces
- Warhead locations and appearances not distorted by inflated balloons
- Gulf War of 1991 – Targets Tumbled at High Altitudes, Targets Broke Into Pieces During Interceptor Homing

# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems



# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems



# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems





Rotation Rate
2.5 Revolutions per Minute



Rotation Rate
5 Revolutions per Minute



Rotation Rate
7.5 Revolutions per Minute

Warhead Locations After One Second

# Conclusion from US Navy Videos of "Successful Intercepts

**Simple countermeasures that disguise the location of the warhead from the infrared homing sensors are very easy to implement and Will Drastically Reduce the Chances of Hitting a Target**

These Could Be Used as Decoys
or to Surround Warheads Disguising Them as Balloons

**Balloons that Have Been Flown in Space**

# The Kill Vehicle Must Determine Which of These Are Warheads and Which are Decoys from 500 Kilometers Range!




The IEO, an inflatable erectable decoy for Minuteman
(L'Garde, Inc. Photo)

Mk 12A Minuteman III Reentry Vehicle

# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems






# Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems


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# Reentry-Phase Defense Systems

## Characteristics of Aircraft and "Short-Range" Ballistic Missiles Engaged by Patriot in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003

# Boost-Phase, Mid-Course, and Reentry Phases of Ballistic from North Korea



# The Challenges Posed by Ballistic and Aircraft Targets



# Why Intercepting Airplanes is Much Less Challenging than Intercepting Ballistic Missiles (1 of 2)



# Why Intercepting Airplanes is Much Less Challenging than Intercepting Ballistic Missiles (2 of 2)




Patriot "Intercept" Where Damaged Lance-Target Continues to Fall to the Ground With Its Undamaged Warhead
Forward Thrown Debris from Explosion of Patriot Interceptor
Debris Cloud from Explosion of Patriot Interceptor
Damaged Lance Continuing to Fall After Patriot "Intercept"
Undamaged Warhead Section of "Intercepted" Lance
Direction of Approach of Patriot Interceptor


Patriot Intercept Attempt
Against a Lance Short-Range
Ballistic Missile
Note that the Lance is Hit
on the Back End of the Patriot
and is Only Slightly Damaged.
In This Situation the Lance
Warhead Will Be Undamaged
and It Will Still Fall to the
Ground and Explode
This Intercept Test Was
Reported as Successful
Lance
Target
Faint Patriot
Contrail
Approaching Patriot
After Motor Burnout


Note that the Patriot Fireball Will
Eventually Double in Diameter
Relative to Its Size in This Video
Frame
Light Reflection from
Fireball Off Camera Lens
Faint Patriot
Contrail
Early Patriot
Fireball


Debris from Exploding
Patriot Being Carried
Forward By Momentum
Patriot Fireball
Intact Lance
Missile Continuing
After Patriot Hit
Patriot Contrail


Patriot Fireball
Intact Lance
Missile Continuing
After Patriot Hit
Patriot Contrail

## Issue 2
## What domestic political and management issues are raised by the PAA?

The PAA is an ill-defined program that appears to have no limits.

It unleashes powerfull bureaucratic forces, particularly those for a significant expansion of the number of interceptors and for additional navy ships to carry the interceptors.

41 of 61 DDG-51 destroyers ($2.6 B each) are or will be capable of launching SM-3 ballistic missile defense interceptors.

Roughly 436 SM-3 Block IA interceptors are requested and will likely be built.

The Block IA interceptor's infrared discrimination is so poor that it cannot tell the difference between a hot piece of unspent solid rocket fuel and a flare or warhead target.

The Block IB will be able to tell the difference between hot and cold bright targets, but it will not replace the Block IA until about 2015. Even with this additional discriminatin capability it will still be vulnerable to the same simple infrared countermeasures as the GMD Kill Vehicle.

## A Mystifying Technical Question

The choice to go to many interceptors implies an emphasis on defending against conventionally armed ballistic missiles.

At $10 million + per interceptor, it is hard to understand why there is no emphasis on passive defense, which worked very well in Israel during the Gulf War of 1991.

## Possible Political Explanation

Putting interceptors into client states is a political mechanism for drawing those states into a closer alliance with the US (Poland and Romania)

# Issue 3
## What international political issues are raised by the PAA?

The job of the military planner is to evaluate evolving threats and to recommend timely actions to deal with them.

Military planners will see the PAA as an "open ended" system that will be constantly expanded and modernized towards achieving "war winning" capabilities.

Currently, the number of interceptors ~ 436 on ~ 41 DDG-51 platforms will initially be Block IA/IB interceptors with limited to low burnout speeds and essentially no practical level of discrimination capability (It measures only brightness) (3.2 to 3.3 km/sec Burnout Speed).

Foreign military analysts will be studying the ambitious upgrades planned for the PAA:

- SM-3 Block IB (Kill Vehicle measures temperature and brightness),
- SM-3 Block IIA (4.5 km/sec Burnout Speed),
- SM-3 Block IIB (5 to 5.5 km/sec Burnout Speed),
- Conversions of additional DDG-51s and the design choices for the DD(X),
- Mk 57 58"Peripheral VLS (Much larger and more capable interceptors)
- A thousand or more interceptors in the futue cannot be ruled out.

The recommendations of foreign military analysts with regard to the US threat of foreign military analysts to their political leadership could be problematic for the US and its allies and friends.

# The Technical Achievements Presumed by the Ballistic Missile Defense Review are Codified in Numerous Statements

- **The United States is *currently protected against limited ICBM attacks*.**
  **This is a result of investments made in the ground-based midcourse defense system (GMD) by the Bush and Clinton administrations over the past decade.**
- **This advantageous position of the US has made it possible to counter the projected ICBM threat from North Korea and Iran for the *foreseeable future*.**
- **However, given the uncertainties about the future ICBM threat, including the time-period in which it could mature, the United States *will have to continue to invest heavily in the GMD system so as to maintain this advantageous position*.**
- **In the area of regional ballistic missile defenses "recent successes" have demonstrated that the US can now rely on missile defense systems like the Navy's Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) ballistic missile defense system and the Army's Patriot and THAAD systems.**
- **The Navy's SM-3 system has proven so reliable in its tests that the US will push hard for major upgrades and deployments.**
- **The SM-3 Block IA will be upgraded to the Block IB (in 2015), to the IIA (in 2018) and to the IIB (in 2020). These upgrades will enhance the already substantial US capability to defend the Continental US from ICBM attack.**

# Basic Outline Obama Missile Defense Plan (Announced on Thursday, September 17, 2009)

- Put Aside (NOT Scrap Flawed) Plan to Deploy 10 Interceptors in Poland and an X-Band Radar in the Czech Republic (Change one flawed plan for another).
- Immediately Use Aegis Ships Armed with SM-3 Block IA Interceptors to Provide Some Defense for Southeastern Europe
- Deploy SM-3 Block IB Interceptors on the Ground As Needed to Enhance Defense Coverage and Number of Interceptors
- Deploy Forward-Based X-Band Radars to Provide Tracking, Discrimination and Engagement Functions for the Defense
- Continue Modernizing the SM-3 Series of Interceptors Towards the Eventual Deployment of SM-3 Block IIA for Full Defense-Coverage of Europe by 2018
- Develop and Use a New SM-3 Block IIB Interceptor for Enhancing Interceptor Firepower Against ICBMs for Defense of the US
- No Mention of Boost-Phase Against Non-Mobile ICBMs Launched from Fixed Sites

# Issues Addressed and Raised by the Obama Missile Defense Plan (Announced on Thursday, September 17, 2009)

- The Plan "Puts Aside" a Defense System that had No Chance of Working and that Addressed a Threat from Iran that Does Not Now, and May Never, Exist
- The Plan Focusses Attention on Iran's Short-Range Conventionally-Armed Ballistic Missiles.
- It Uses Much Lighter, Less Expensive, and Therefore Potentially Many More Interceptors to Address Existing Iranian Capabilities to Launch Many Tens of Shorter Range Conventionally-Armed Ballistic Missiles that Could be Used to Attack Targets in Southeastern Europe (Turkey, Greece, etc.)
- The Choice to Go to Many Interceptors Implies an Emphasis on Defending Against Conventionally Armed Ballistic Missiles. At $10 million + per Interceptor, It Is Hard to Understand Why There is No Emphasis on Passive Defense.
- The Interceptors Could be Readily Deployed on Ships or on Land, Where They Can Be Located for Optimal Defense of Potential Targets.

# Issues Addressed and Raised by the Obama Missile Defense Plan (Announced on Thursday, September 17, 2009)

- **The Interceptors, Which Home on the Infrared Signals from Attacking Missiles at High-Altitude Will Still Be Susceptible to Certain Infrared Countermeasures. However, As Long As the Attacking Ballistic Missiles are Not Nuclear-Armed, the Effects of Successful Countermeasures Will be Much Diminished Relative to Attacks that Utilize Nuclear-Armed Ballistic Missiles.**